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We conduct  the  ﬁrst  empirical  economic  investigation  of  the  decision  to cheat  by  uni-
versity  students.  We  investigate  student  demand  for essays,  using  hypothetical  discrete
choice  experiments  in conjunction  with  consequential  Holt–Laury  gambles  to derive  sub-
jects’ risk  preferences.  Students’  stated  willingness  to participate  in  the  essay  market,  and
their  valuation  of  purchased  essays,  vary  with  the  characteristics  of  student  and  institu-
tional  environment.  Risk preferring  students,  those  working  in a  non-native  language,  and
those  believing  they  will  attain  a lower  grade  are  willing  to pay  more.  Purchase  likelihoods
and  essay  valuations  decline  as the probability  of  detection  and associated  penalty  increase.
© 2015  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.
. Introduction
This paper investigates student cheating and the market in essays. The essay market is illicit and growing. It creates infor-
ation asymmetries and hence an economic problem since the signaling of graduate quality via degree grade is weakened.
nformation asymmetries also characterize the market for essays with student buyers frequently struggling to locate ‘rep-
table’ suppliers who will provide essays that are both original and of the required quality. It is also characterized by strategic
ehavior, with those essay companies selling ‘lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970) having an incentive to disrupt buyers’ attempts to
ain reliable reputational information regarding suppliers.The demand for essays involves the interplay of risk, penalties and the payoffs and the ethics, norms and risk preferences
f the individual facing the option to buy. Since the internet has reduced the search costs for potential buyers of illicit essays
o markedly, the cheating market is constrained only by supply side capacity and consumers’ willingness to pay.
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We  investigate students’ willingness to pay for written to order essays supplied by commercial providers. This is done
by conducting hypothetical discrete choice experiments with university students in which they choose over essays system-
atically differing in terms of price and quality, the risk of detection and the penalty if caught. The purchase and submission
of such essays is risky, and such behavior will be conditioned by the individual’s risk preferences. We  investigate this by
deriving individual-speciﬁc estimates of risk aversion, via a 2nd choice experiment over consequential gambles, which are
included in the essay choice model.
We ﬁnd that half of our subjects indicate a willingness to buy one or more essays in the hypothetical essay choice
experiment. Students’ stated willingness to participate in the essay market, and their implicit valuation of purchased essays,
vary with the characteristics of student and institutional environment. Risk preferring students, those for whom English as
an additional language, and those expecting a lower grade are willing to pay more. Purchase likelihoods and essay valuations
decline as the probability of cheats being detected, and the penalties if caught, increase.
The structure of the paper is as follows: ﬁrst we  summarize the position regarding plagiarism in universities with speciﬁc
emphasis on the rise of the market in essays. We  then describe the study design, present results from the two choice
experiments conducted and discuss their implications.
2. Contract cheating
The problem of plagiarism is growing in universities. A 2011 survey of over 1000 college presidents in the US revealed
that 55 percent thought that plagiarism was on the rise. Business Schools such as those at UCLA and Penn State have recently
begun scanning the admission essays of their MBA applicants because of the scale of the problem (Parker et al., 2011). In
the UK over 17 000 cases of cheating were recorded at universities in 2009–2010, an increase of 50 percent from four years
previously (Barrett, 2011).
There is an incentive to cheat both to enter (a better) university and also to secure a (higher grade) degree. The prize is
not only prestige but also economic; the average salary returns to higher education are approximately 27 percent (Blundell
et al., 2005). The grade of degree awarded matters also; in the UK workers with higher grade degrees have wages 6 percent
higher than other graduates 6 years after graduation (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000).
Widespread cheating within universities weakens the information content of graduates’ degrees as an indicator of
their quality, and an information asymmetry results. There is for able, honest students and for employers, universities
and government, an incentive to reduce students’ cheating and the corroded quality signals that result from it.
We address a speciﬁc form of cheating whereby students order an assignment of a given standard to be delivered in a
given period at a ﬁxed price, known as ‘Contract Cheating’ (CC, Clarke and Lancaster, 2006). The Contract Cheating market has
been boosted by technological change. First, technical change has pushed cheaters into the CC market because the probability
of detection of traditional cut-and-paste plagiarism, and recycled papers, has increased with the greater use by universities
of scanning systems such as TurnItIn. Second, the internet has reduced to almost zero the potential buyers’ search costs,
facilitating rapid ordering, payment and delivery.
The purchasing process for work takes two main forms: the buyer commissions work at a ﬁxed price (most sites) or,
alternatively, posts the work and potential suppliers bid for the work with the buyer in some cases able to see previous
buyers’ ratings of work done by bidding writers (e.g. vworker and, historically, essaybay). The information available about
this illicit industry is patchy and nearly all concerns the supply side of the market; the UK CC market in CC was estimated to
be worth £200m in 2006 with one company (UKEssays) reported to have 3500 writers. Little is known about the demand
side of the market.
While the internet has reduced the costs of locating suppliers hugely, the difﬁculties of assessing online suppliers’ quality
are substantial. Information asymmetry characterizes the Contract Cheating market as well as the graduate labor market:
lemon essays exist as well as lemon graduates. For the cheat there are 2 forms of lemon essay, which differ regarding
the point of revelation of the essay’s poor quality. The purchased essay may  be original and impervious to detection, but
not match the prescribed quality (too low, too high) something only revealed after purchase, via the student’s or grader’s
assessment. Alternatively, if the work is unoriginal it is likely to be detected via scanning and the customer identiﬁed as a
cheat.1
Observation of the essay market suggests it is awash with lemons. Forums on sites such as essaychat.com and
www.essayscam.org are dominated by appeals for information on reliable companies or the airing of grievances toward
sites from both buyers (for non delivery or delivery of low quality work) and writers (for non-payment). Information asym-
metries and the lack of recourse for buyers (PayPal will not refund buyers since they deﬁne essays as ‘intangible goods’ which
are excluded from their dispute resolution framework.) create large numbers of disgruntled, defrauded customers.The aspiring cheat is suffering because the good essays are being driven out by the bad. The incentive to reduce the infor-
mation asymmetry exists for both good companies and buyers. The beneﬁciaries of the market failing are bad companies, and
also honest students, universities and employers. Buyers try to reduce the information asymmetry by seeking reputational
1 Many essay companies respond to buyer fraud (for example the buyer using a stolen credit card) by posting the sold essay online so it will become
incorporated within TurnItIn’s database and the fraudulent plagiarizer caught.
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nformation in these online forums. Monitoring of these forums and the claims and counter-claims that ﬁll them suggests
hat bad companies are systematically sabotaging these attempts by churning these information ﬂows.
There are very few economic analyses of the student’s decision to cheat and none of the contract cheating market. Research
n education has found that those with high intrinsic motivation, who regard study as being conducted for its own sake, are
ess likely to cheat than those who exhibit extrinsic motivation and regard study as a means to an end (Davy et al., 2007;
urdock and Anderman, 2006). In addition, perceptions of social norms regarding cheating, especially those of the person’s
ohort or peer group, are found to affect the likelihood of cheating (McCabe et al., 1997; O’Rourke et al., 2010). An alternative,
ut related, perspective comes from the economics of crime and punishment, and rational choice (Becker, 1968). Collins
t al. (2007) and Quandt (2012) develop theoretical models of student cheating within an expected utility framework. Their
odels have intuitive outcomes: the presence and extent of cheating depends on both institutional parameters (detection
robabilities and penalties) and individuals’ characteristics (preferences for grades and risks). If the utility costs associated
ith detection are large enough, then even opportunities for cheating which have zero direct costs and low detection rates
ill not be exploited. Further, the utility costs of detection depend upon the interaction of the penalties imposed and the
ndividual’s characteristics.
There is evidence that for some even a zero detection probability would not induce them to cheat. A recurrent ﬁnding
n experimental studies is that while signiﬁcant proportions of subjects will act dishonestly whenever there is an economic
ayoff, others will avoid dishonesty in all cases. The ﬁnding that a substantial proportion refuse to lie even in situations
here all parties beneﬁt from the lie (a ‘pareto white lie’) supports the idea of pure lie aversion (Erat and Gneezy, 2012)
mplying some students will never enter the essay market regardless of market and institutional conditions. A third group,
he ‘partially dishonest’, may  be induced to act dishonestly as inter alia the payoff, the degree of anonymity and the impact of
heir dishonesty on others are moderated (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013; Gneezya
t al., 2013). A commonly cited explanation of partial dishonesty (for example lying to increase a payoff but not to the fullest
xtent possible) is the maintenance of a “favourable self-concept”. People act in a way that their behavior and associated
ains are not sufﬁcient to prompt an irresolvable conﬂict between the act and their self-perception:
“People often resolve this conﬂict through creative reassessments and self-serving rationalizations . . . such that they
can act dishonestly enough to proﬁt from their unethicality but honestly enough to maintain a positive self-concept”
(Gino et al., 2013: 285–286).
These creative reassessments and rationalizations are observed in studies of plagiarism in which excessive workload
ressures, poor teaching, poor guidance on academic practice and the need to cheat in order to keep up with many other
heaters in their cohort are all justiﬁcations cited by plagiarists (see Devlin and Gray, 2007). However the purchase of essays
ay  place a greater strain on the behavior–self image relationship than traditional copy and paste plagiarism, being viewed
y some as qualitatively different from traditional plagiarism, as “bad” or “blatant” cheating (Sisti, 2007). How such behavior
s perceived in terms of its effect on others, and the how personal the dishonesty is perceived as being, are likely to affect
he willingness to undertake the act, in addition to the degree of private gain (Cappelen et al., 2013). One might expect some
tudents to never buy essays while others will if there are gains to be had; others will only cheat if those gains are sufﬁcient
o outweigh the risks and costs, subject to the maintenance of self-image.
In this study the interplay of institutional parameters (risk of detection and penalty) and personal characteristics (aca-
emic ability, risk preferences) in generating the demand for essays are analyzed empirically, within a formal framework,
or the ﬁrst time. We  examine the demand for essays, and how their value varies with the characteristics of both essay
nd buyer. We  analyze how the stated willingness to pay for an essay varies with it’s quality, the risk of being caught and
he penalty associated with detection. The cost and quality will be determined in the market. The penalty will be set by
he university, while the risk of detection is a function of both the university’s actions and the functioning of the market
whether a cherry or lemon is bought). The relevant characteristics of the buyer include, inter alia, their risk preferences,
heir abilities in the subject matter and their opportunity costs of time.
. Study design
In common with other illicit markets (Pudney, 2003; Cook et al., 2007) direct observation of prices and demand levels
n the essay market is problematic; prices can be observed but many are for lemon essays and demand is unobserved.
he absence of good revealed preference data prompts us to use a stated preference approach to investigate the nature
f demand for essays. We  use a hypothetical discrete choice experiment (DCE) to investigate students’ willingness to pay
or essays. Such choice experiments are widely used in, inter alia, health (San Miguel et al., 2002), food (Aoki et al., 2010)
nd transport (Hensher and Greene, 2003) economics. Their theoretical underpinnings originate in Lancaster (1966) and
he decomposition of a product’s value into the sum of the values of its attributes. This theoretical framework was made
perational with the development of Random Utility Theory (RUT) and associated statistical models of choice (McFadden,
974).Respondents in a discrete choice experiment are presented with repeated choice sets. Each option within the sets is
omprised of a series of attributes which vary in level. Respondents identify which of the options they prefer. With sufﬁcient
esponses across a sufﬁciently wide range of choice situations, one can estimate the implicit weight given to attributes’ levels
n the choices that have been made. Further, one can analyze the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between attribute
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Table  1
Essay attributes and levels.
Attribute Levels
Essay grade 1st class, 2(i), 2(ii), 3rd class
Risk  of being caught None, 1/1000, 1/100
Penalty None, 0% for course unit, Repeat the year
Price £100, £50, £75, £25
levels and, where a monetary attribute is included, the MRS  between the monetary attribute and non monetary attributes
represents the willingness to pay (WTP) for changes in attribute levels.
In this study we conduct two choice experiments. The ﬁrst, hypothetical, concerns essays, the second, consequential, is
over gambles. The objective of the second DCE is to identify individuals’ risk preferences since we believe a priori that these
will be important in explaining willingness to pay for the illicit essays. The recruitment process and structure of the two
experiments are now outlined.
4. Recruitment
To make the essay choice scenarios as realistic as possible they had to be presented in the context of a speciﬁc piece of
work that was due to be submitted not long after the experiment was  conducted. The process conducted at 3 UK universities2
was to identify a 2nd/3rd year undergraduate course which had a largely textual assignment, due soon, which accounted for
a signiﬁcant proportion of the unit’s ﬁnal mark. Then, with the approval of the unit lecturer, students were invited to attend
the experiment which was held 2–3 weeks before the submission date. At the session the precise purpose and format of
the experiment was explained (see online Appendix) and students given the opportunity to leave (none did). It was made
clear that the research was unequivocally based on conﬁdentiality, and had been approved by a University Research Ethics
Committee on that basis.
Students completed a hard copy survey containing sections concerning demographics and educational past, views and
experiences of plagiarism, and the essay and gamble choice sets. This was  collected at the session’s end with students
retaining a separate sheet on which they had recorded their gamble choices. An on-screen random number generator was
used to determine (i) which of the gambles was  to be played out for payment and (ii) the outcome of the selected gamble.
Students then handed in their gamble choice sheet and received payment in cash (attendance fee + gamble winnings) as
they left the room.
5. Choice experiment over essays
Students were asked to consider purchasing essays for the forthcoming unit assignment. The essays differed in terms of
4 attributes: price, grade,3 risk and penalty, as shown in Table 1.
Deﬁning attribute levels close to those observed in the illicit essay market was  problematic. Although many prices are
observable the proliferation of scam sites means that many (possibly most) are not associated with an essay of the necessary
quality. Clarke and Lancaster (2013) tabulate prices on vWorker and Freelancer sites identifying 21 jobs completed for one
contractor which averaged £71 when dissertations are excluded, and jobs for 13 writers which had prices ranging between
£43 and £300. The risk attribute levels were also problematic since the number of commercially sourced essays submitted is
unknown, as are the numbers detected. Given the reported scale of the industry the number of disciplinary cases involving
Contract Cheating appears tiny suggesting that either buyers are not submitting or, more plausibly to us, a tiny fraction
of those submitted are detected. We  regarded the levels selected as credible but not deﬁnitive, and we were interested in
whether respondents’ essay choices would be signiﬁcantly affected by variation in the 2 risk levels presented.
An experimental design maximizing D-Efﬁciency4 (Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007) was  generated to combine the attributes
and levels into options and sets. The design comprised 2 blocks of 8 choice sets with each set comprising 4 alternatives.
Respondents were randomly allocated to either block of 8 essay choice sets. The 4th alternative in each set was a ‘buy none’
option. An example essay choice set is shown in Fig. 1.
One element of purchasing an essay in the real market is absent from the set up used in the choice experiment: uncertainty
over the essay’s quality. As discussed above the essay market features many lemons. This could be incorporated by including
an additional attribute which captures uncertainty in essay quality. This was excluded because of the additional cognitive
load associated with a second probability appearing in the choice sets and because sample size was  thought likely to be a
constraint on identifying the effects of more attributes.
2 Identiﬁed here only as Universities A, B and C.
3 The UK undergraduate system classiﬁes marks as: 70%+ [1st class], 60–69% [Upper Second: 2(i)], 50–59% [Lower Second: 2(ii)] and 40–49% [a 3rd].
Marks  below 40% are classiﬁed as fails.
4 D-efﬁciency is essentially a method that ensures the choice sets are arranged so as to obtain the lowest possible standard errors when the model is
estimated for a given sample size. For a more complete description readers are referred to (Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007) as a starting reference.
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Fig. 1. An example essay choice set.
Fig. 2. An example gamble choice set.
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rThe ‘buy none’ option warrants some further comment. It comprises an essay with zero penalty, risk and price and of
he grade the student predicts they will obtain if they write the essay themselves. Consequently we  asked the participating
tudents for a predicted grade if they were to submit their own  assignment.
This grade prediction varies over students, and deﬁnes the ‘none’ option in each of their choice sets. This emphasizes an
mportant issue regarding the design of a study of this nature. A student may  be prepared to buy an essay for one course
nit in which they struggle, but not in another in which they excel. This means that research into the demand for papers
hould be conducted regarding speciﬁc course units, it cannot be done meaningfully in a generic context.
. Choice experiment over gambles
We  expect individuals’ risk preferences to affect their willingness to buy, and their marginal valuations of, essays of
iffering quality. As risk preferences are unobservable we conduct a second, consequential, DCE, over gambles, to estimate
hem. We  employ a lottery design based on Holt and Laury (2002, see Charness et al., 2013, for an overview) in which students
hoose a preferred gamble to play from a series of pairs (e.g. A or B in Fig. 2). To ensure all choices were consequential, it was
xplained that one of the gambles would be selected at random and played at the end of the session, with the associated
ewards paid in cash.
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7. Modeling choice
The analysis of the choice experiment data for both essays and gambles is based on Random Utility Theory, and extensions
of the conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974). We  outline the approach in general here before specifying the detail of the
econometric implementation for the essay and gamble choice data, which differed.
Assume individual i is faced with a choice situation t with M alternatives with the attributes in the mth choice set deﬁned
as the vector zitm. We  denote Zit = {zitm}Mm=1 as the set of attributes deﬁning choice situation t for individual i and ˇi as the
parameters deﬁning the ith individual’s utility function. The probability that person i in choice situation t selects alternative
m is given by:
P(yit = m | Zit, ˇi) (1)
The conditional logit model of this probability is given by:
P(yit = m | Zit, ˇi) =
exp(Vm|zitm,ˇi )∑M
m′=1 exp(Vm′ |zitm′ ,ˇi )
(2)
where Vm|zitm,ˇi is the systematic component of utility derived from the attributes’ levels, which differ across alternatives,
and the additive random component of utility is drawn from a Gumbel distribution (see Train, 2003). We  now outline the
speciﬁcation of the RUT models employed for the analysis of choice over gambles and essays, beginning with the former.
7.1. Modeling gamble choices
The purpose of the analysis of the choice of gamble from the pairs offered is to derive a measure of risk aversion for each
individual. These risk preferences are then to be used to explain choices over essays. The decision to cheat may  be viewed
as an economic gamble and thus attitudes toward risk, revealed by choices over monetary gambles, may  also explain the
decision to cheat.5
We  consider two approaches. The ﬁrst is rooted in Expected Utility Theory (EUT). The second approach expresses risk pre-
ferences in terms of the distributional moments of uncertain monetary outcomes. A bridge between the two approaches can
be constructed by appealing to Taylor approximations (Levy and Markowitz, 1979) or by making distributional assumptions
such as normally distributed payoffs or, more generally, location-scale restrictions (Meyer, 1987). The well documented
anomalies of EUT (see Rabin and Thaler, 2001) have spawned many alternative approaches to conceptualizing behavior
under risk such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and ‘ﬁrst order’ risk aversion (Epstein and Zin, 1989). It
is the second of these approaches that we explore here as an alternative to EUT.
The expected utility approach is implemented using the expo-power utility function employed by Holt and Laury (2002).
The moment approach uses the ﬁrst and second moments of the gamble payoff distribution. Both approaches are imple-
mented via estimation of mixed (random parameter) logit models (Revelt and Train, 1998).
The expected utility approach uses the utility function:
Ui(witm) = − exp(−i(ωi + witm)i ) (3)
where ωi is the (unobserved) wealth of individual i, witm is a monetary amount presented within alternative t in gamble m,
and i and i are individual-speciﬁc parameters to be estimated. The absolute Risk aversion for the individual is −(U ′′i )/(U ′i) =
ii(ωi + witm)−1 − (i − 1)(ωi + witm)−1. The expected utility of a gamble between two monetary amounts witm and w∗itm
with probabilities pitm and 1 − pitm is therefore:
VG,EUT
itm
= (pitmUi(witm) + (1 − pitm)Ui(w∗itm)) (4)
The ‘moment function’ approach is implemented using:
VG,Moment
itm
= e˛i
(
itm +
i
2
(02itm + (2itm)
1 )
)
(5)
where itm is the expected payoff faced by individual i in alternative t in gamble m,  and 2itm is the variance of that payoff,
with 0 and 1 to be estimated along with individual-speciﬁc parameters ˛i and i. When 0 = 1 = 1, Eq. (5) takes the form
that would be derived from a second order Taylor approximation of an expected utility function,6 where i is proportional
to the Pratt–Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion. We  implement and compare 4 formulations of the Moment model.
Moment model 1 is unrestricted. However, in portfolio theory the utility function is more commonly speciﬁed without the
quadratic term on payoff (0 = 0) and Moment models 2–4 are variants of this. In Moment model 2 0 is constrained to
5 Estimates of risk aversion may  be context speciﬁc. We are interested in whether estimates of risk aversion derived from the gamble choices provide
information that can help rationalize choices in the essay choice experiment. For this to be the case we  need only that risk preferences in the two contexts
are  correlated.
6 Deﬁne w, wealth; x, payoff with a distribution f(x) then U(w + x)  U(w) + U ′(w)x + ((U ′′(w))/2)x2 ⇒ E(U(w + x)) ∝ E(x) + (1/2)(U ′′(w))/(U ′(w))E(x2)
where  E(x2) = E(x − E(x))2 + E(x)2.
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Table  2
A  combined risk-penalty measure.
Probability of detection Penalty Risk-penalty dummy
1/1000 0% for the course unit RP1
1/1000 Repeat the year RP2
1/100 0% for the course unit RP3
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b1/100 Repeat the year RP4
e zero while 1is unrestricted. In Moment model 3 0 = 0 and 1 = 1. Within the literature on risk aversion it has been
uggested (Epstein and Zin, 1989) that the standard deviation may  be a better predictor of behavior than the variance which
ives Moment model 4 (0 = 0, 1 = (1/2)).
In estimating the parameters using non-linear mixed logit models a Gumbel error is added to Eqs. (4) and (5) in which
ase the probability of a given choice takes a logistic form. The parameters of interest are g(ˇi) = (ωi, i, i, ϕ) for (4) where ϕ
s an additional parameter representing the scale variance of the Gumbel error, and g(ˇi) = (˛i, i, 0, 1) for (5). The ˇi are
ssumed to be normally distributed with a mean and covariance (potentially conditioned on individuals’ characteristics),
ith constant parameters (0, 1) having zero variance.
In the expected utility model we assumed that all parameters ωi, i, i were log normal, therefore the utility function
mposed increasing relative risk aversion, with absolute risk aversion free to be decreasing, increasing or constant. Within
he Moment model ˛i and i was speciﬁed as normal (or conditionally normal). The parameter 0 was  constrained to lie on
he unit interval by specifying 0 = (e
0 )/(1 + e
0 ) where the parameter 
0 could take any real value. The parameter 1 was
onstrained to be strictly positive by specifying 1 = e
1 where 
1 could take any real value.
.2. Modeling essay choices
To model essay choices we employ a mixed logit model with discrete mixing distributions (McFadden and Train, 2000).7
his speciﬁcation of the mixed logit considers there to be a ﬁnite number of discrete classes of preferences. We  believe a
riori that preferences toward cheating are polarized with some students strongly averse to entering the market whereas
thers will, to varying degrees, be open to purchase depending on institutional parameters and the interplay between their
wn abilities and the characteristics of the essays available. Hence we  seek in estimation to identify the number of discrete
lasses that best approximate the choice behavior observed, noting that as the number of classes increases in the limit the
odel approximates the continuous mixed logit model.
We  model the utility associated with an essay as a linear-in-parameters function of P attributes, the levels of which vary
cross the m alternatives. Additionally, we assume that there are a number of discrete latent classes (x = 1, . . . K) within the
ample, which differ with respect to the parameters of the utility function. We  deﬁne the class speciﬁc vector of parameters as
att
x = (ˇattx1 , . . .ˇattxP )
′ and the set of all parameters as ˇatt = {ˇattx }Kx=1. The vector of essay attributes faced by the ith individual
n set t is zitm = (zitm1, . . . zitmP)′ and, as above, we denote Zit = {zitm}Mm=1. The systematic component of utility for a member
f class x, is modeled as:
VEssay
m|x,zitm,ˇatt
=
P∑
p=1
ˇattxp zitmp (6)
The attributes in (6) are deﬁned as the price and grade of the essay being purchased (deﬁned as dummy  variables) and
he risk-penalty regime in which it is available. We  specify the risk and penalty attributes as a combined term (Table 2) since
he risk attribute has little intuitive meaning if there is no penalty, and vice versa.
Deﬁning ˇatt = {ˇx0, ˇx1, . . .,  ˇx3, ıx1, . . .,  ıx4}Kx=1, we specify the systematic component of utility that person i derives
rom essay m in choice set t, conditional on being a member of class x, as:
VEssay
m|x,ˇatt ,zit
= ˇx0pricetm +
3∑
g=1
ˇxggradetmg +
4∑
r=1
ıxrRPtmr (7)7 Other models estimated permitted investigation of misreported preferences, which seemed credible in the context of students being asked about
lagiarism. The issue of misreporting can be addressed in the elicitation process, for example by using randomized response techniques (see Caudill and
ixon,  2005), or the estimation process. We investigated the issue via estimation of models (see Balcombe et al., 2007, 2009) which allow for misreporting
ut  found no evidence of systematic misreporting (results available upon request).
30 D. Rigby et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 111 (2015) 23–37
where:
gradetmg is the grade of the essay in alternative m in choice set t.
For essays offered for purchase this is the level of the grade attribute (speciﬁed as g dummies for a
1st  through to 3rd grade essay, the latter used as the baseline: see Table 1).
For the ‘none’ option this will be the respondent’s self-predicted grade (1st through to 3rd class,
since no student predicted they would fail)
pricetm is the price of the essay in alternative m in choice set t;
RPtmr is the risk/penalty regime (speciﬁed as dummies, see Table 2) operational in alternative m within
choice set t.
ıxr is the utility associated with risk-penalty level r, for members of class x.
Introducing latent classes, we re-state (2) as:
P(yit = m | x, Zit, ˇatt) =
exp(VEssay
m|x,zitm,ˇatt
)∑M
m′=1 exp(V
Essay
m′ |x,zitm′ ,ˇatt
)
(8)
We  explicitly model class membership using a multinomial logit functional form, based on a J × 1 vector of characteristics
Ci and a set of parameters ϒ = {ϒx}Kx=1 where ϒx = (ϒx0, ϒx1 . . . ϒxJ) such that:
P(x | Ci, ϒ)  =
exp(Sx|Ci,ϒx )∑K
x′=1 exp(Sx′ |Ci,ϒx′ )
(9)
where:
Sx|Ci,ϒx = ϒx0 +
J∑
j=1
ϒxjCij (10)
and the restriction
∑K
x=1ϒxj = 0 is imposed for purposes of identiﬁcation.
The likelihood of individual i making their sequence of choices over the T choice sets faced is:
P(yi | {Zit}Tt=1, Ci, ˇatt, ϒ)  =
K∑
x=1
P(x | Ci, ϒ)
T∏
t=1
P(yit | x, Zit, ˇatt) (11)
where yi is the vector of all responses by the ith individual. The likelihood function is therefore the product of (11) over all
individuals in the sample. Estimation proceeds by maximizing this likelihood with respect to ˇatt and ϒ.
8. Results
We  recruited 90 students. Descriptive statistics for the sample, split by their English as an Additional language (EAL)
status, is provided in Table A1 of the online appendix. The gender split of the sample was 57% female, 43% male, with all but
one of the 90 participants in the 18–24 age range. The sample comprised both humanities and science students, 72 spoke
English as their ﬁrst language and 83% had taken their pre-University examinations in a UK educational institution. Ten of
the 90 students knew one or more people who had bought an essay (22% of the EAL students, 8% of non EAL) and ten had
been warned over their use of sources previously (17% of the EAL students, 10% of non EAL). The students’ predictions for
their coursework are also shown in the table, while the proportions predicting Upper and Lower Second Grades is stable
between EAL and non-EAL students there are marked differences at the top and bottom of the grade ladder: EAL students
more likely to predict a low pass, non-EAL more likely to predict a top grade.
8.1. Gamble choice results
The proportion choosing each of the paired gambles are shown in Table A2 in the online Appendix. Mixed logit models of
the alternative gamble choice speciﬁcations (4) and (5) are estimated using Bayesian methods (Train, 2003; Balcombe et al.,
2009) with ˛i, i conditioned on the individual’s characteristics (students’ gender8 and university). Mixed logit estimation
involves estimation of the parameters (mean and variance) which deﬁne the distribution from which the preferences of those
in the sample are drawn. Estimation yields individual-level point estimates of risk aversion, conditional on that distribution
and an individual’s choices.
The performance of the EU and four formulations of the Moment model are reported in the online Appendix. We  restrict
ourselves here to noting that the EU model is outperformed by all the Moment models. The model which performed best on
predicting gamble choices was Moment Model 4 (87% gamble choices predicted) in which linearity in the standard deviation
8 See Booth and Nolen (2012) for more on the evidence regarding, and possible causes of, gender differences in risk aversion.
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Table  3
Parameter estimates: mixed logit model on gamble choices.
Mean Standard deviation
¯˛ 0 0.947 0.274
˛uni B −0.201 0.362
˛uni C 0.243 0.445
˛female 0.238 0.312
¯0 −0.265 0.162
uni B 0.347 0.186
uni C 0.392 0.214
female −0.286 0.166
var (˛0i) 0.702 0.424
var (0i) 0.333 0.097
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ccov (0i , ˛0i) −0.264 0.174
N  = 720; LMargL = −284.62
as imposed (1 = (1/2)). We  note that the correlation in the estimates of risk aversion is very high (0.97–0.99) for Moment
odels 1, 2 and 4.
We report (Table 3) the full results of the Standard Deviation Moment model in which the means of the distributions of
i and i are conditioned on students’ university (A, B, C) and gender (female = 1 for females)9:
VGm|itm,itm,ˇi = exp(˛0i + ˛BBi + ˛CCi + ˛femalefemalei) ×
(
itm +
0i + BBi + CCi + femalefemalei
2
itm
)
(12)
The upper panel of Table 3 reports the mean and standard deviations of the estimates of the mean of the distributions of ˛
nd  for the base group ( ¯˛ 0, ¯0; University A, males) and the terms which shift the means of these parameters’ distribution
y University (˛C, ˛B ; B, C) and gender (˛female, female). The lower panel of Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviations
f the estimates of the variance of the distributions of  ˛ and . The estimates of  indicate the degree to which different
roups tend to avoid standard deviation in the gamble.
Clearly the more negative , the more risk averse. The fact that in Table 3 the standard deviations for the group estimates
or  have mean estimates of around 1.8 greater than their standard deviations suggests that they are moderately signiﬁcant,
n the sense that if we treated these as classical estimates they would be signiﬁcant at around a 10% level of signiﬁcance. In
ehavioral terms there is a substantive difference in that we can see that for some of the universities there is tendency for
tudents to actually be risk liking as opposed to risk averse. This is also reﬂected in the kernal density plots in Fig. 3.
The estimate of var() indicates signiﬁcant heterogeneity around the means of the distributions for each
niversity–gender combination. Students at University A are more risk averse (¯0 = −0.265) than the rest of the sample,
ince increases in  represent increasing preference for risk. Males are less risk averse than females (female = −0.286), ceteris
aribus, consistent with past ﬁndings (see Charness and Gneezy, 2012). The degree of the heterogeneity in risk aversion is
vident in Fig. 3, a kernel density plot of the distribution of students’ risk preference coefﬁcients (i). While we  can say that
here appears to be a range of individuals that are risk averse through to risk seeking, it is more difﬁcult to make a comment
bout whether this range of  constitutes a meaningful difference in risk attitudes.
The primary motivation of deriving individual-speciﬁc measures of risk aversion (i) is to assess whether these risk
references play a signiﬁcant role in the model of essay choice. We consider the value of these risk aversion estimates
urther when discussing the models estimated on essay choice data in the following section.
.2. Essay choice results
Each respondent was presented with 8 essay choice sets, leading to 720 choice occasions in total. Half of the sample
ndicated they would buy at least one of the essays offered, whereas half never opted for a purchased essay. The proportion
f ‘buyers’ was stable across the 3 universities. The frequency of ‘purchase’ was  variable across the sample, with 7 people
ndicating they would buy on all eight occasions while ten people opted to ‘buy’ on only one of the 8 choice occasions.
Latent class models, using the utility function speciﬁcation in (7), are estimated. While it is possible to segment the sample
nto classes on the basis only of choices, individual characteristics may  be used additionally to explain class membership
see Eq. (9)). Two characteristics were found to be consistently signiﬁcant: English not being the student’s ﬁrst language and
9 Using ¯ˇ  | , D to denote a draw of ¯ˇ  from its conditional distribution given  and D, with D denoting the data (choices made by all individuals),
stimation proceeds by taking some arbitrary starting values of  ˛ and  and proceeding to draw {ˇi} | ¯ˇ , , D then ¯ˇ  | , D, {ˇi} and then  | ¯ˇ , D, {ˇi},
nd  repeating this sequence for g= 1,. . .,G. The ﬁrst g* draws are disregarded so that the draws are approximately independent of their starting values.
ccordingly, the draws for {ˇi}g from each iteration g of the chain can be recorded. The priors for all ¯ˇ  estimated were normal with mean zero with
ovariance I.
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Fig. 3. Kernel density plot of  i .
Table 4
A 2 class model of essay choice.
Attributes Class 1 Class 2
Coefﬁcient Standard error Coefﬁcient Standard error
Utility functions
price −0.029 0.013 −0.014 0.005
RP1 −3.314 1.371 1.284 0.489
RP2 −2.884 1.142 0.106 0.392
RP3 −3.628 1.167 0.399 0.393
RP4 −4.323 1.260 −2.053 0.524
grade  2(ii) 0.737 0.979 0.999 0.366
grade  2(i) 0.935 0.965 1.885 0.339
grade  1st 3.088 0.970 2.609 0.352
Class  membership
Intercept 0.484 0.208 −0.484 0.208
EAL  −1.283 0.373 1.283 0.373
  −0.722 0.315 0.722 0.315
N  = 720; LL = −367.637
the individual’s degree of risk aversion, i, derived from the gamble experiment.10,11 A number of variables were tested as
class membership predictors but proved insigniﬁcant. These included gender and university identiﬁer (although these were
included in the estimation of i), whether the student had a part time job (a possible indicator of greater time pressure) or
had previously been warned about their use of sources.
Estimation requires the number of classes to be speciﬁed ex ante. We  follow current practice (Hensher and Greene, 2003;
Train, 2008) of using information criteria (IC) to compare model speciﬁcations. The Bayesian Information Criterion and
Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC) support a 2 class speciﬁcation and it is results from this speciﬁcation which
we report in Table 4.
The model correctly predicts 83 percent of the essay choices. For both classes the price term is negative and there is the
expected progression of increased utility from essays of higher grade. A striking difference between the two  classes occurs in
the impact of changes in the risk-penalty regime. For Class 2, the risk-penalty coefﬁcients show an intuitive progression from
positive and signiﬁcant (for the most lax) through to a large negative and signiﬁcant value for the most stringent regime, RP4.
10 We note that  is an estimated term with an associated standard error. The complexity of incorporating that error within the multinomial logit class
membership model within a latent class model means that the uncertainty in  is not captured within the essay choice model.
11 We tested whether EAL status and estimates of  i were signiﬁcantly correlated with stated willingness to cheat in a reduced form model. Both terms
were  signiﬁcant in a probit model in which the dependent variable was whether a person ‘bought’ one or more essays in the essay choice experiment.
Predictions from a probit model featuring only  i correctly predict the (non) buying status of 60 of the sample of 90.
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or Class 2 many grade upgrades, under several risk-penalty regimes, generate a net utility gain, implying that this segment
epresents those who are willing to enter into the market if they consider the conditions right. For Class 1 the marginal
tilities for risk-penalty are all negative from RP1 through to RP4 and the utility gain from moving from the lowest grade of
aper (a 3rd) to the highest grade (a 1st) would cause a net utility loss under all risk-penalty regimes except RP2. Even in
hat case, the net utility gain from buying one’s way  from the bottom to the top pass grade is very small. This suggests that
or this class of person, if they predict they will pass (however low their grade), there is almost no incentive to participate
n the market.
Not having English as a ﬁrst language is found to be determinant of class membership: those without English as a ﬁrst
anguage (EAL = 1) are signiﬁcantly more likely to be a member of Class 2. In addition, those who are less risk averse (larger
) are more likely to be members of Class 2 and hence more likely to enter the essay market.
A fuller assessment of the interpretation of the behaviors represented by the 2-class model of essay choice requires a
ormal consideration of willingness to pay (WTP) for essays, and predicted probabilities of purchase. This analysis requires
onsideration of an additional piece of information: the individuals’ expectation of the grade they would receive for their
wn work. This is considered next.
.3. Essay valuations and probabilities of purchase
Choice experiment data permit estimation of both the value associated with a marginal change in an attribute level and
he value associated with switching from one alternative to another. The DCE design was  such that the ‘purchased essay’
ptions always featured a non-zero level of risk and penalty, while the ‘buy none’ option always featured zero risk and
enalty. Hence the risk-penalty variables collectively represent both the risk-penalty characteristics of a purchased essay
nd other, unstated, elements associated with purchasing an essay. This value is subsumed into the estimate of the 4 risk-
enalty parameters; there is effectively a ﬁxed component associated with purchasing any essay that is independent of its
ualities. This is the net effect of both positive (savings in time and effort) and negative (disutility from dishonesty) aspects
f purchase.12
Derivation of the value of an essay to a student must take account of the paper’s quality and cost, the risk-penalty regime
nder which it is bought, and the risk preferences and English Language status of the student as well as their own-grade
xpectation.
The WTP  for a paper will be individual- and class-speciﬁc and can be identiﬁed as that price (price∗igr) at which student
 becomes indifferent between buying an essay of grade g under risk-penalty regime r and submitting their own  work. We
eﬁne self predicted grade as P and hence ˇxP represents the utility from submitting one’s own paper in the expectation of
hat grade. Student i is therefore indifferent between purchase and submission of their own  work when:
ˇxP = ˇx0price∗igr + ˇxg + ıxr (13)
Rearranging (13) yields the maximum price at which the student will purchase:
price∗igr =
ˇxP − ˇxg − ıxr
ˇx0
(14)
The parameters in (14) will be class (x) speciﬁc and hence one can generate conditional WTP  values for each class, or
n unconditional value based on the expected probability of class membership. WTP  for essays in speciﬁc conditions are
btained through simulation. Taking 1000 random draws of the parameters, based on a multivariate normal distribution and
tilizing the estimated variance covariance matrix of the parameters, a distribution of simulated WTP  values is generated
Krinsky and Robb, 1986). This distribution yields median WTP  and associated conﬁdence intervals13 for each essay type.
hese WTP  values are displayed in Fig. 4 (and in Table A4 in the online appendix with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals for
hose values which are signiﬁcantly positive).
Each of the four panels in Fig. 4 shows how WTP  varies with the grade the student expects if they submit their own
ork. Within each panel the WTP  is shown for each combination of the 4 essay grades one could buy and the 4 risk-penalty
egimes. Only signiﬁcant WTP  values are shown. In the ﬁrst panel, representing students who predict their own work would
eceive a 1st grade mark, an essay will only be purchased if it is also of a 1st standard and only within the least stringent
isk-penalty regime, RP1. The value of such a paper is £93 and represents the amount the individual is prepared to pay to
void the work needed to submit their own work in that risk-penalty environment; there is no grade upgrade involved, only
he avoidance of work.
While the results do not allow the decomposition of the some of the ﬁxed gains from buying an essay (savings in time
nd effort, utility from having outwitted the system, etc.) we can infer something about the value of time. For example, it
ust exceed £92 pounds for Class 2 since this is the amount that respondents are prepared to pay for an essay of the same
rade as they predict for their own work. While the results do not allow the decomposition of the some of the ﬁxed gains
12 Decomposition of these effects would require essays that could be bought with zero risk of detection; including such options in the design was thought
oo  unrealistic.
13 The signiﬁcance of a WTP  value is based on a 1-tail test since our concern is identifying statistically signiﬁcant positive WTP  values.
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 £Fig. 4. WTP  for essays of differing grade, by own grade expectation and risk-penalty regime.
from buying an essay (savings in time and effort, utility from having outwitted the system) we  can infer something about
the value of time. For example, it must exceed £92 pounds for Class 2 since this is the amount that respondents are prepared
to pay for an essay of the same grade as they predict for their own work.
Inspection of the other panels reveals that as the students’ predicted grade falls, WTP  for all essays increases, up to a
maximum of £277 for a 1st grade essay bought by a student expecting a 3rd, under the low detection, low penalty regime,
RP1. There is never a positive WTP  for an essay under the most severe risk-penalty regime (RP4).
We now consider the probability that a student will purchase coursework. This requires evaluation of the probability that
a member of each class will purchase an essay, combined with the probability of class membership for a speciﬁc individual.
The former requires assumptions about the cost and grade of the purchased paper, the buyer’s own  predicted grade, and the
risk-penalty regime in place. The latter, the probability of class membership, is determined by English language status and
risk preference. Fig. 5a shows the probability of purchasing a 1st grade essay for £200, if the student has English as a ﬁrst
language and predicts they would attain a 3rd level grade. The evolution of the probability as the individual’s risk aversion
changes is displayed for each of the risk-penalty regimes. Fig. 5b displays these purchase probabilities for a student also
expecting a 3rd level grade but without English as a ﬁrst language. These ﬁgures show the very low probability of purchase
under the most severe risk-penalty regime, and the relatively high probability of purchase under the lowest risk-penalty
regime. The role of English as a ﬁrst language in our sample is also highlighted here, such that a student who has English as
their ﬁrst language and low risk aversion has a similar probability of purchase as a student for whom English is not their ﬁrst
language and strong risk aversion. For those with English as an additional language, the distribution of  within the sample
is such that approximately 75 percent of this sub-sample have a probability of purchase in excess of 50 percent when the
risk-penalty regime is at its most lax (RP1).
We are wary of making general inferences from the powerful EAL effect observed in this small sample of 90 students (of
whom only 18 are EAL students). However it does resonate with some previous ﬁndings. Bretag (2013) reviews empirical
evidence on the relationship between EAL status and academic malpractice including Marshall and Garry’s (2006) ﬁnding that
EAL students were more likely to have committed serious plagiarism than non-EAL counterparts, Vieyra et al.’s (2013) ﬁnding
that 47% of EAL graduate students had committed plagiarism in research proposals and Bretag et al.’s (2013) ﬁnding that
international students were more than twice as likely as domestic counterparts to be unconﬁdent regarding the avoidance
of breaches of academic integrity.Some caution is also required when assessing the valuations and purchase probabilities since our essay choice models are
based on stated preferences. When considering the potential for hypothetical bias one is wary of systematic misreporting of
preferences. In particular, choice experiments in which there is a ‘warm glow’ associated with certain options are at risk of
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Fig. 5. Probability of a student who is expecting a 3rd grade buying a 1st grade essay for £200, under each risk-penalty regime, as  varies.
ver-valuing those products and attributes. In the case of essays it might be the case that students did not treat the choices
ufﬁciently seriously and over-report their willingness to buy. However, there may  be an opposite effect: the fear of self
ncrimination may  have caused respondents to under-report their willingness to buy since the experiments were conducted
n-campus, under the supervision of academics. The warm glow of giving might have been replaced by the cold fear of
elf-incrimination. The net effect of these pressures to over- and under-report is unknown.
The papers’ valuations under risk-penalty regimes RP2 and RP3 are very similar. Thus the movement from low to high
enalty can be offset for the buyer by a shift from high to low risk of detection. The information asymmetries and associated
uality uncertainty in the market about whether a purchased paper is truly original will translate into higher risks of
etection. Thus the market constraining impact of lemon essays in reducing incentives for plagiarism can be offset by low
enalties if caught. However it is only when both the risk of being caught and the penalty are high that students in Class 2
re deterred from entering the market at all. Thus, although it may  be encouraging that the essay market is characterized by
nformation asymmetries, universities also have to provide sufﬁciently negative incentives, via sufﬁciently harsh penalties,
o constrain the market.
It should also be noted that the ‘low’ level of the penalty attribute (zero mark for the course unit) is more severe than
he penalty that is applied in many institutions for a ﬁrst offence (Tennant et al., 2007) and so WTP  is expected to be higher
nder these more lax regimes. Also, no student predicted they would fail and therefore we can neither estimate WTP  nor
he probability of its purchase, for such students. We  expect their valuations, and their likelihood of entering the market for
apers, to be higher than those reported here.
. Conclusions
This paper is the ﬁrst formal economic investigation of the demand for essays. It reports university students’ willingness
o buy, and their valuations of, bespoke papers from commercial providers. To investigate the demand for papers accurately it
s necessary to pose the option to buy with respect to a realistic scenario. An individual’s willingness to buy may  differ across
ourse units hence it is necessary to frame the choices with respect to a speciﬁc piece of work. This approach is employed
sing choice experiments with 90 students at 3 UK universities. Given the anticipated role of risk preferences in the decision
o cheat, a consequential gambling experiment is conducted, from which individual speciﬁc risk preferences are derived. In
he hypothetical essay choice experiment students revealed their willingness to purchase an essay for submission for credit.
We ﬁnd women to be more risk averse than men. Students who  are less risk averse and have English as an additional
anguage are more likely to ‘buy’. The small sample size of 90 cautions against making any general claims, but the ﬁndings
hat EAL status is a strong predictor in the latent class essay choice model and 15 of the 18 EAL students opted to ‘buy’ on one
r more occasion is notable. This EAL effect resonates with ﬁndings from other studies in the plagiarism literature. Half of the
ample refuses to ‘buy’ an essay in all of the 8 choice sets. This may  represent pure aversion to dishonesty or reﬂect that the
ombined effects of risk, price and grade attributes are insufﬁcient to persuade partially dishonest respondents to enter the
ypothetical market. Of the 45 students who opted to ‘buy’ at least once, only 7 of them opted for purchase on all 8 choice
ccasions. This, and the signiﬁcant estimated effects of the essays’ attributes, suggest that respondents carefully evaluated
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essay characteristics when considering engaging in contract cheating. The WTP  value for some in the sample reaches £277
($445) for a 1st grade piece of work. The valuations decline with the quality of the essay, increases in risk and penalty and
the student’s own-grade expectation.
Further analysis of the demand for essays would be enriched by a greater understanding of the attitudes and norms of the
students and their peer groups. Given the experimental evidence on lying, a better understanding of student perspectives on
the negative effects, if any, of cheating on others, and how this varies between traditional and contract cheating, would aid
understanding of the market’s development. Similarly, the degree to which contract cheating challenges the self-concept of
(which) students in a more profound and troubling way  than copy and paste plagiarism will also shed light on the growth
of the essay market. As the market grows the justiﬁcation that such behavior is necessary to keep up with other cheaters
will be reinforced, further fuelling essay market growth.
Knowledge of the variability in the time it would take students to write, rather than buy, papers and their opportunity costs
of time would also enrich further work on contract cheating. A critical aspect of the market which should be incorporated
in further work is uncertainty about the quality of the paper being purchased. In this study buyers were assured that the
essay purchased would be of the stated grade. Asymmetric information and the fear of buying a lemon may  well prevent
some buyers in this hypothetical study from participating in the real market. In this case the activities of reputable (and
disreputable) companies to reduce (increase) the information asymmetries facing buyers will signiﬁcantly affect the growth
of the market in essays. Another extension to make the choice experiment more closely resemble the market would be to
incorporate time pressure. Many essay providers charge higher prices for quicker turnarounds: an essay needed within 48 h
is typically more expensive than one required a month later.
We consider it remarkable how many students, in a study administered by academics, indicate a willingness to buy. The
assurances of conﬁdentiality were genuine but the level of purchasing indicated was contrary to the expectations of both the
authors and their colleagues. Why  is there such an apparent lack of stigma in revealing a willingness to purchase essays? It
may be that the ethical line that most Faculty perceive as being crossed when such purchases are made is not that signiﬁcant
to many students. At a time when the university student is increasingly treated as a consumer demanding value for money
it would appear that subcontracting some of the work required to achieve their degree is seen as a rational choice for many
consumers on campus.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.jebo.2014.12.019.
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